The impact of World War I on Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, 1914-1918

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Abstract

In my last paper, I introduced the origin and development of Japanese settlement in Papua and New Guinea (Iwamoto, 1995). In New Guinea (German colony), until the outbreak of World War I, Japanese settlers enjoyed German protection and prospered. In Papua (Australian colony), in the same period, Japanese set their root firmly through intermarriages with Papuan women, although the Japanese were marginal in terms of population and economic activities and hardly attracted the attention of Australian administration. The outbreak of World War I had a significant impact on the Japanese in New Guinea where a small battle was fought and colonial rulers changed from the Germans to Australians, but the war scarcely affected those in Papua where no battles were fought. The Japanese in New Guinea had to abandon their friendly relations with Germans and establish a new relation with the Australians. The war challenged their ability to manipulate the precarious situation that New Guinea was about to become an extension of the White Australia. In this paper, I examine how the Japanese tried to overcome this challenge. I also try to set their position in the overall context of Japanese interest in nan'yō (the South Seas) in relation to ideology and economy in an attempt to present World War I as a turning point.

Key words: World War I, Japanese settlers, Papua and New Guinea, Australia, German administration

Introduction

Until the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, Japanese migration to New Guinea was constantly increasing. The number of passports issued before August 1914 was 32 compared to 22 of 1913. The war impeded further increase. In 1915 no passport to passengers bound for New Guinea was issued. The battle in New Guinea was so small that no Japanese were injured nor their property damaged, but the uncertainty about the future of the colony affected Komine’s business greatly. No new orders for shipbuilding came and trading stopped. Under Australian military rule, the Japanese faced the challenge to create amicable relations with Australians, abandoning the long-term relations with Germans. Japan was allied to Britain, which meant fighting alongside Australia against Germany. Therefore the war obliged the Japanese to switch their relations with white rulers from the Germans and to the Australians.
World War I in New Guinea

The Germans in the Pacific were poorly prepared for the war. They had no forces capable of fighting in Samoa, the Marshalls or the Carolines. Their only garrison, at Rabaul, consisted of 240 native soldiers and 61 Europeans but had no fixed defences or field artillery, and there was only one machine gun in Madang in mainland New Guinea (MACKENZIE, 1927). The Germans were 'fully aware of their own military weakness' and attempted in vain through diplomacy to exclude China and the Pacific from the fighting zone (BARCLEY, 1978).

Consequently, suffering few military losses, the Japanese navy swiftly occupied German Micronesia. The Japanese occupation was hardly publicised. Hirama rightly argues that the navy knew that possession of Micronesia would be decided at the peace conference after the war and thereby acted swiftly in order to establish a fait accompli (HIRAMA, 1987).

Australians were also swift in occupying the German territories south of the equator – Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Bismarcks and Nauru. They fought a small battle in New Guinea more than two weeks before a Japanese warship anchored off Jaluit on 30 September. The Australian government dispatched the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force consisting of 'six companies of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, a battalion of infantry at war strength (1,023 strong), two machine-gun sections, a signalling section, and a detachment of the Australian Army Medical Corps' (MACKENZIE, 1927). Their main missions were the destruction of a German wireless station at Bitapaka near Kokopo and the occupation of German New Guinea. The Germans in New Britain surrendered shortly after the wireless station was taken. On 12 September, the Australians occupied Rabaul, then Madang on 26th. The 'only real fight' (BISKUP, 1968) of the operation was the battle for the Bitapaka station which incurred casualties of only '2 officers and 4 men killed' (MACKENZIE, 1927).

Although the war was essentially a European event for both Japan and Australia, their occupation of the Pacific islands had important strategic significance— for Japan to counter the US naval force and for Australia to keep the Japanese from expanding further south. What is more important in terms of colonial history in the Pacific was that the defeat of Germans 'ushered in a new era' (OLIVER, 1951) with a new 'political map' (NELSON, 1995). New colonial masters took over German interests with superior military strength: the Japanese in Micronesia, Australians in New Guinea and Nauru, and New Zealanders in Samoa. The new map was finally endorsed in 1921, a result of the Paris Peace Conference.

Rise of nanshin (southward advancement)

The Japanese occupation of German Micronesia revived nan'yō fever which had been
cooling towards the end of the Meiji period (1868-1912), although few attention was paid to Papua and New Guinea. Nanshin-ron (southward advancement theory) advocates quickly expressed their enthusiasm in literature. As early as December 1914, Nan’yō böeki chōsa-kai (the South Seas Trade Research Society) began to promote emigration to the islands:

Among the South Seas islands, Japanese flags are raised high on the Mariana Islands, closest to Japan, on the Marshalls and Carolines. Is not today the time easiest to emigrate to those islands?...Go, go, go and develop that heaven-sent treasure in the Pacific (NAN’YŌ BŒKI CHŌSA-KAI, 1914).

Their enthusiasm is shown by the number of publications. According to the bibliography of the Nihon takushoku kyōkai (Japan Colonisation Society), the number of publications even for general references to the South Seas was phenomenal: in only three years from 1915 to 1918 28 pieces were published—a remarkable contrast to the 30 pieces published in the previous 46 years from 1868 (NIHON TAKUSHOKU KYŌKAI, 1944).

Ideas about nanshin also changed. Shimizu argues that the outbreak of the war was a turning point in the evolution of nanshin-ron, from the Meiji nanshin-ron which emphasised peaceful economic expansion to the Taishō nanshin-ron which was a blatantly expansionist ideology (SHIMIZU, 1987). Taishō advocates expressed their territorial desire and proposed to establish a Japanese block in the South Seas. They asserted Japanese right in the South Seas emphasising the geographical proximity (compared to the western powers) and to les extent Japan’s historical linkage. The Japanese occupation of Micronesia made such evolution possible. Southeast Asia and Melanesia were now immediate neighbours. Japanese vessels could reach Singapore, Manila and Rabaul in much less days from Ponape than from Yokohama or Kobe.

Tokutomi Sohō(3) and Inoue Masaji were the leading advocates who facilitated the ideological evolution. Tokutomi played a crucial role. His interpretation that ‘nanshin-ron was an ideology to supplement nanboku heishin-ron [the theory of simultaneous advance to the south and the north] and hokushin-ron [the northward advance theory]’ (SHIMIZU, 1987) reconciled the conflict between the navy-led nanshin-ron and the army-led hokushin-ron. Until then the army’s hokushin-ron had been overwhelming the navy’s nanshin-ron. The hokushin-ron meant the advancement to the continent in East Asia, and had been a pillar of Japanese imperial strategy after its victories in the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War. Tokutomi also introduced Pan-Asianism, calling it Japan’s ‘moral imperialism’, in which Asians had to be freed from white rule by Japanese (SHIMIZU, 1987). In this, he included the South Seas as the region where the white rule had to be removed. Thus he subtly combined nanshin with Pan-Asianism, and appealed to the nationalists who had been asserting Japan’s stronger role to lead Asia. Tokutomi was also practical and influential. He virtually controlled nan’yō publications, supervising and publishing them through his publishing company
Inoue was more impressive. He advocated a stronger and simpler form of expansionism than Tokutomi, although he did not follow Tokutomi’s argument on the combination of nonshin and hokushin or ‘moral imperialism’. In 1915 Inoue published Nan’yō, one of the best known nonshin books which he emphasised that the South Seas were a natural sphere of Japanese territory, using the word ‘dai nihon-shugi [Great Japanism]’:

With Asianism as a final object, in order to achieve Great Japanism, although it is necessary to acquire the territories north of Korea, expansion towards the south is more important and natural. Historical relations between Japan and the South Seas as well as geographical relations concede and promote Japan’s southward advancement (Inoue, 1915).

The same argument was introduced by Nitobe Inazo, a well-known liberal. In 1915, he wrote an article titled ‘Bunmei no nonshin’ [The Southward advancement of civilisation], in which he introduced a unique but baseless idea that the Japanese were attracted to the South Seas because they had Malay ancestry (Nitobe, 1915).

What was more characteristic about nonshin-ron in this period was that ideological evolution was followed by commercialism. The trend is obvious from the titles of main-stream publications, which had hardly been seen before the outbreak of World War I, such as Nan’yō kane-mōke hyaku-wa [A hundred stories about how to make money in the South Seas], Nan’yō tokō an’nai [Guide book to go to the South Seas], Nan’yō no yashi sai-bai ni tsuite [About planting rubber in the South Pacific], Nan’yō ni okeru honpō shōhin gaikyō [General situation of Japanese goods in the South Seas] (Omori, 1914; Yoshida, 1915; Arima, 1915; Nan’yō Bōeki Shinkō-kai, 1917) and so on. In 1915, Jitsugyō no Nihon [Business Japan], one of the most widely read business magazines, published a special issue, ‘Nan’yō-gō’ [Issue for the South Seas] (Jitsugyō no Nihon-sha, 1915)—a 170-page issue, twice as thick as normal issues, was filled with information about the South Seas’ (Yano, 1979). The opening article was a landmark for the emergence of commercial nonshin:

In the South Seas, there are blessings from the sun in the sky and there are unexploited treasures on the land. The South Seas welcome us and do not deter us from exploiting their resources. They are nothing but the places which heaven has provided for us for the development of our race (quoted in Yano, 1979).

Thus, early Taishō nonshin-ron began to develop perceptions that the South Seas had a rich and accessible economic potential. That had an important impact on the Japanese interest in the South Seas, because the perceptions were widespread not only among intellectuals but also in business circles.

The establishment of private organisations and companies followed and expressed the
rise of Japanese economic interest. On 30 January 1915, the Nan’yō kyōkai (South Seas Society) was established. Although it was a private organisation, the Society’s membership included leading nanshin-rōn advocates, politicians and officials influential in making policies about the South Seas. The president was Earl Yoshikawa Akimasa, a prominent politician, and the Vice-President was Uchida Kakichi, the Governor of Taiwan. Inoue was also a foundation member. The Society had two main objectives — promotion of trade and popularisation of the South Seas. The Society exhibited Japanese goods in Southeast Asia, promoted language study, sent commercial trainees to the area and held public lectures. It also published countless literature about the South Seas. One of the most well-known of its publication was the journal, Nan’yō kyōkai kaihō [The Report of the South Seas Society] (later changed to Nan’yō kyōkai zasshi [The Journal of the South Seas Society] in 1920 and Nan’yō [The South Seas] in 1937), which was widely read and became a major source of information.

Businessmen hurried to take advantage of the opportunities. From 1914 to 1918, fourteen new companies were established (NAN’YŌ DANTAI RENGO KAI, 1942), ushering in a new-company rush that continued until the outbreak of the Pacific War. Businessmen’s eyes were fixed on the rich natural resources in Southeast Asia. New companies mostly undertook plantations — eight companies were involved in rubber (reflecting the increased demand for rubber in Europe), and three each in hemp, jute and copra. The other companies engaged in trading. A giant commercial firm, Mitsubishi, was also established and expanded its interests into Southeast Asia.

The government was active in promoting economic activities. It financed the Kaigai Kōgyō Kaisha (Overseas Industrial Company) of 1917 that amalgamated several other emigration companies. The company, cooperating with the Taiwan Ginkō (Bank of Taiwan), became a major financial institution for promoting emigration, industry, investment and education. Although later the company’s major interest turned to emigration to Brazil, it first established an extensive network in the South Seas. Agents were posted to Thursday Island, Darwin, Broome, Manila, Davao, and Singapore. The company was equivalent to the Tōyō Takushoku Kaisha (Oriental Development Company) which was formed in 1908 with government funds in order to facilitate the colonisation of Korea and later Manchuria. As Irie argues, the establishment of the Kaigai Kōgyō was the first step towards the government’s direct involvement in the South Seas (IRIE, 1938).

Japanese perceptions of Papua and New Guinea

The Japanese officials did not show much lively interest in Papua or New Guinea, despite their proximity to Micronesia. Attention was mainly directed to Micronesia and Southeast Asia. The number of publications demonstrates clearly Japanese indifference. Only three books dealt with Papua and New Guinea, out of tens of new South Seas
titles published from 1914 to 1918. Similarly, out of the fourteen companies established in the war period, thirteen were in Southeast Asia and one in Micronesia (NANYō DANTAI RENGO-KAI, 1942). The government did not take much interest, either, except the officials in the Foreign Ministry who had to respond to Komine’s financial petition.

Although there was no specific reference to Papua and New Guinea, the Nan’yō Boeki Chosa-kai (South Seas Trade Research Society) published Nan’yō no hōko [Treasure in the South Seas] in December 1914 (NANYō BÔEKI CHÔSA-KAI, 1914). The book included general information (geography, climate, people, culture, industry, economy and Japanese relations) about Micronesia, Southeast Asia, New Caledonia and New Guinea. In the section on the ‘former German islands’, the book emphasised the islanders’ general good feelings towards the Japanese and alluded to the validity of the Japanese occupation:

The islanders had been receiving cruel treatment under the oppressive German colonial policies and [had been exploited] by foreign traders who had enjoyed their privileges as colonisers. As a result, the islanders despise them and seem to be welcoming the Japanese. Our navy’s occupation was greeted by extremely overjoyed islanders (NANYō BÔEKI CHÔSA-KAI, 1914).

However, the islands had a low economic profile. In the view of the Society, the islanders had no industry except copra production and there were few benefits in trading:

However, there are few items we can import, because the natives have no industry. They do not produce anything....The only natural product we should import from them is copra—a speciality of all Pacific islands. The copra trade occupies about ninety percent of the total trade and the rest consists of a small quantity of marine products (NANYō BÔEKI CHÔSA-KAI, 1914).

Likewise the Japanese navy’s attention was directed to Southeast Asia. Nan’yō tsuran (The survey of the South Seas), a huge volume (926 pages) written by Captain Hosaka Hikotarō in 1916, gave the most detailed information on the South Seas (HOSAKA, 1916)10. But Hosaka wrote mostly about Dutch and British colonies in Southeast Asia, and devoted only one page to Papua and two pages to German New Guinea. Hosaka briefly mentioned Komine and his business and said that Rabaul would be a promising place for Japan’s economic development. He also pointed out the uncertainty about the future of New Guinea until the conclusion of the peace treaty (HOSAKA, 1916).

The lack of interest was greatly regretted by Japanese residents in New Guinea. Fujikawa Masajirō,9 a manager of Komine’s Nan’yō Kögyō Kaisha, wrote in his book.

Recently studying the countries and people in the South has become very popular. However, the region that the people call nan’yō is usually Java, Sumatra, Celebes and Borneo. Some people even believe only the area around Singapore is nan’yō.
Although some people think that nan'yō includes a wider region than those, they widen it in the direction of Burma, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines. Few people know about New Guinea, which lies massively to the north of Australia, and the thousands of small islands surrounding New Guinea (Fujikawa and Maruba, 1914).

Partly due to lack of information, the stereotyped perception of New Guineans remained unchanged. Shibata Tsune'ė, an anthropologist of Tokyo University, wrote in the introduction of Fujikawa's book.

German New Guinea, the northeast area of New Guinea, maintained its characteristics. The level of civilisation is extremely low. The natives are mostly at the stage of the Stone Age, using stone implements. Cannibalism was still prevalent (Fujikawa and Maruba, 1914).

Japanese in Papua

**Australian perceptions of Japanese**

The impact of World War I was scarcely felt in Papua. No battles were fought. And the Australian administration was hardly involved in the war effort, as all operations were directed from Melbourne. The Australian administrator, Hubert Murray, reported:

> Probably there is no part of the Empire where it is so difficult to realize that a state of war exists. There is no recruiting in Papua, no military display, no bands, no processions, no return of wounded men—none of the innumerable things that bring the war home to the most dull-minded elsewhere (Papua Annual Report, 1917).

In these circumstances, Australian perceptions of the small number of Japanese in Papua remained unchanged from the prewar period. The Papua Annual Report from 1914 to 1918 had no comments on the Japanese, except for giving their total population figures. As Table 1 shows, the Japanese population stayed static. All still lived in the Milne Bay area. Similarly the number of other non-indigenous coloured population showed little change, indicating successful migration restriction. Also there were little change in the number of the whites, indicating that the stagnant economy was significant.

There are only two events related to the Japanese and recorded in official documents other than Papua Annual Report. The Territory of Papua Government Gazette reported the death of Nagahama Sorgi, a Japanese carpenter, at Yapoa on the north-east coast
Table 1. Non-indigenous populations in Papua, 1914-1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>South-Eastern</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>European</td>
<td>Other coloured*</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,186</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*non-indigenous

Source: Papua Annual Report, 1916-1920

(Territory of Papua Government Gazette, 1915). In the following year, his name appeared again in the ‘Return of Estates Administered’ (Territory of Papua Government Gazette, 1916). The list shows that the scale of Nagahama’s business was far smaller than most European entrepreneurs. The Japanese sources have no records about him.

The other one was a surprise visit of a team from the Japanese mining company, Fujita Gumi (Fujita Company),(8) to Port Moresby in 1916 to investigate copper mining on the Astrolabe Field near Port Moresby. The five-man team arrived at Port Moresby without prior notice but managed to interview an Australian official, who immediately sent a report to Melbourne. According to his report, the Japanese seemed to have detailed information about the mine and made concrete proposals:

The points on which these gentlemen wished to consult me were—
(1) whether in regard to copper mining any distinction was drawn between Europeans and Japanese,
(2) whether, assuming that they took over the mines, they would be allowed to bring in Japanese to act as their higher officials—such as managers, engineers, and clerks—or whether all such persons must be Europeans,
(3) whether they would be allowed to use the ROUNA Falls, a waterfall some 18 or 20 miles out of Port Moresby, for the purpose of generating power for the service of their mines.(9)

The Japanese proposal did not materialise, and it is unknown whether the Australians rejected it or the Japanese withdrew. However, the event indicates that there were some speculative Japanese industrialists who cast their eyes on mineral resources in Papua.

Japanese settlers

There are no written records about the Japanese from 1914 to 1918. Information is available from oral evidence only.(10) A major characteristic of the oral sources is the lack of recollections related to the war, confirming Murray’s comment. The Japanese
carried on their business in trading, diving, and copra planting as before. They raised their families and kept on entrenching their presence in the local communities.

The following information concerns events memorable within the Japanese community. Kalo Murakami, the only child in the Murakami family, was born in 1916. Kalo's real name was Kalaupi in the Misima language, which means 'a little boy'. But his father, Heijirō, could not pronounce it properly and called him Kalo.\(^{11}\) Tanaka Shigematsu seems to be the only one who went back to Japan when the war broke out, and he died in his home village in Nagasaki in 1917.\(^{12}\)

### Japanese in New Guinea

**Impact of Australian military operations**

The outbreak of war was an unexpected tribulation for the Japanese who had just begun to prosper under German rule. But their response showed their agility. The report of Samejima San'nosuke, a clerk of Komine's company,\(^{13}\) is the only Japanese written source to give a detailed account of the impact of Australian military operations on the Japanese. It is titled 'Senji zaijū jōkyō hōkoku sho' [Report on the local situation during the war].\(^{14}\) The report shows how the Japanese at Rabaul managed to reconcile their relations with both Germans and Australians.

On 8 August, upon the German declaration of war, the Germans at Rabaul prepared hastily. Samejima wrote:

[On 9 August] the German residents, who were on the military list, were drafted to form a volunteer Corp and to defend [Rabaul]. However, the Germans had built no military facilities here. Although they had three hundred native soldiers, they were mostly labourers and had little capacity to fight. Out of those natives, a hundred and fifty were posted to the administration at Rabaul and the rest were sent to other administrative stations in the territory to be used as labourers to clear land or as cleaners. In the morning on the same day, the volunteers and the native soldiers were summoned. In the afternoon five officers, a hundred volunteers and a hundred and fifty native soldiers were all armed. The Germans shifted their administration from Rabaul to Toma, a place in the hills thirty miles west of Rabaul. Those men were sent to Toma to defend the new administration (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

On the same day, the Germans detained the British and French, and restricted the movement of Japanese residents.

In the morning, the Namanula, a boat owned by Komine, was about to sail to New Ireland in order to collect logs for boat building. But the German officials stopped and
moored it at the pier of the Lloyd Steamship Company. They also removed and confiscated the Namanula's auxiliary engine, although in the morning on the following day the Germans sent guards to Komine's shipyard and returned the engine. On the same day five British and one French man were detained at Baining (twenty miles west of Rabaul), and an order was given that the Japanese should not go north beyond the hill behind [Rabaul] nor sail more than one mile to the south. In these days, the town was restless. Not only German shops but also small Chinese shops were closed. The townsfolk gathered here and there and spent time in endless discussions (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

At dawn on 11 August, three Australian destroyers, the Yarra, Warrego and Parramatta, appeared in Simpson Harbour and surprised the German residents who were expecting the German squadron to rescue them. The appearance of the Australian ships also panicked other Rabaul residents.

Some Germans hid their furniture, buried valuables, packed their luggage, and ran away into the bush. Many Chinese stayed in their houses. All townsfolk raised their own flags to show their nationality. We raised the Rising Sun on the mast of the Namanula and at our shipyard. Soon the destroyers of the British-Australian squadron anchored opposite our shipyard and one moored at the wharf of the Lloyd Steamship Company. About ten sailors, led by one commander, landed and went to the post office and destroyed the telephone. They did not do anything else and soon the squadron left the harbour, and since then we heard nothing about them (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

At this stage Japan had not yet declared war against Germany, and Komine cooperated with the Germans who assured the Japanese residents of their safety.

In the afternoon of the same day [11 August], the administration requested a 25 horse-power motor from our shipyard in order to set up a wireless station near Toma. Fortunately we got one and sold it at wholesale price to the administration. Until then, Komine's shipyard had been doing work for the administration. The payment for our boat building, repair, construction work and sales of furniture used to be made after tax was deducted in the end of the financial year. The sales of the motor then made the total payment twenty thousand Deutsch mark. Although the operation of the Australian squadron ended without achieving much, the townsfolk speculated a great deal and were unable to lead a normal life. Most [German] residents, being recruited as officials and soldiers, moved to Toma. As a result, Rabaul fell to near anarchy. But the administrator [sic: he was an acting administrator] sent his officials, who came riding horses, and visited the remaining Germans and the Japanese in the shipyard. He sent us a message that the administration would provide food from the administration's storage whenever
requested so that we could do our work as usual without difficulties. The administrator's treatment was due to Komine's service to the administration in the last ten years since the administration had been established. The administration always respected and protected the Japanese residents (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

The 'anarchy' in Rabaul was also felt among the European residents; a German postal official noted on 10 August that 'there were fears that the Chinese might be dangerous because of threatened food shortages and because of unemployment among them' (THRELFALL, 1988). Then, according to Samejima, in order to cope with the dangerous situation, the acting-administrator, Eduard Haber, suggested that Komine form an armed Japanese militia.

On 16 August Komine sent a message, as a representative of the Japanese residents, expressing sympathy for the administrator [sic] in this difficult situation. The administrator sent his official to reply to Komine's message with deep gratitude, and requested, 'Our situation depends on the war in Europe and our home government did not acknowledge the need to send troops to its colonies. We are resigned to surrender our territories to the enemy without resisting if we are attacked. Therefore we are not worried. However, I am most concerned about two thousand Chinese most of whom became unemployed because of this war. They do not have enough food due to the stopping of sea transport and very likely they will become vagrants and steal things and may rebel. That will be most grievous event but there are not many Germans left in Rabaul to prevent it from happening. But if you lead your employees [to form a militia], such an event can be prevented. The administration will supply weapons immediately if you need any. My worry will end if you cooperate' (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

We can only speculate whether Haber really made such a request, as no German or Australian records mention it. Although it is possible that the request was made secretly and no records were kept, the following part of Samejima's report suggests that Komine was keen to eliminate the Chinese, rivals of Japanese businessmen in the South Seas, and that Komine saw the outbreak of the war an excellent opportunity to 'wipe out' Chinese influence.

Komine is a brave man not being afraid of death. He thought he could contribute to Japanese development overseas if he could wipe out all Chinese from the earth on this occasion, and in doing so he could serve his country because the Chinese had been impeding Japanese business activities abroad. He immediately summoned all his eighty employees and spoke about his idea, saying that the administrator [sic] also asked him to do so. His employees were all excited and unanimously agreed with Komine's proposal. Then Komine called upon the vice-administrator to express his idea. The vice-administrator was over-joyed and shook his hands
The proposal to form a Japanese militia had two advantages for Komine: it could satisfy his business ambition and his patriotism.

However, the plan was wrecked, when the Japanese government, using the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, declared war against Germany on 23 August. Hearing the news, Komine quickly notified Haber of his withdrawal of the proposal to form a militia.\(^{(15)}\) However, the Germans did not become hostile towards the Japanese. According to Samejima,

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\text{Komine quickly called upon the administrator [sic] and said, 'Although I promised [to form a militia] according to your request, I would like to inform you of the cancellation of my promise because today Japan declared war against Germany and I, being a Japanese subject, cannot serve an enemy country.' The administrator accepted Komine's cancellation and said, 'It is impossible to change our home country's foreign policies, but nations and individuals are different. Even if our nations are fighting each other, you can carry on your business as before. Our administration provides you with as much protection as possible (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).'}
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Haber's words proved true. The administration did not keep Komine in custody (although the British were imprisoned) and provided food for the Japanese as promised.

Nevertheless, the Japanese declaration of war provided a profound dilemma for the Japanese in New Guinea. They would be disloyal if they kept friendly relations with Germans who were showing genuine friendship. But they decided to cooperate with the Australians possibly for two reasons. The first reason is natural: they chose to be loyal to their home government. But the second one is compelling. They needed to rely on the Australian force for the supply of food, because they were suffering from extremely serious shortage of food and had nobody but Australians to rely on because the regular shipping service of the Norddeutscher Lloyd Company ceased at the outbreak of war. Local produce was also short due to severe drought. The situation was so serious that Komine had to cut down rations for his employees to the extent that non-labourers had only one meal a day (SAMEJIMA, date unknown). Samejima noted that the food situation worsened around the time when the Australian expeditionary force arrived and occupied Rabaul on 12 September.

Therefore, in order to survive, Komine had to start establishing friendly relations with the Australians. In doing so, Komine had luck. The pilot of the Australian fleet happened to be Komine's acquaintance who had worked in Rabaul about five years earlier, and on 13 September he came to Komine's shipyard without knowing it was Komine's and asked him to install wireless facilities for the Australian force (SAMEJIMA, date unknown). Komine accepted the job and started working for the Australians on 14 September.\(^{(16)}\)
Samejima, on behalf of Komine, then asked the captain of the Australian warship, which was returning to Sydney, to deliver an urgent message to the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney to ask for food (SAMEJIMA, date unknown). It was not Komine but Samejima who went to the Australian captain to ask for help. Considering the urgency of the problem, it would be natural for Komine, being a leader of the Japanese community, to ask the Australian captain, but he did not. His hesitation may reflect his long-established good relations with the Germans. Also the undisciplined behaviour of the Australian landing force might have made him hesitant to rely on them. Samejima continued:

The Australian soldiers had no military discipline. They frequently broke into the houses not only of the Germans but also of Chinese and natives and stole money and valuables. They came to Komine's shipyard and demanded drinks, and some soldiers even did so by threatening with their bayonets. As a result, the Australian commander put guards at our shipyard for about two months (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

Samejima's report is correct. The commander of the Australian force, William Holmes, also wrote to the Minister of Defence, Melbourne: 'I regret to have to report there has been a good deal of crime amongst the Troops since they settled down to routine Garrison duty here.'

Nevertheless from late September to early October, Komine acted swiftly for the Australians. He undertook to salvage the German steamer *Koloniales Gesellschaft* which had stranded on the reefs at Cape Lambert. The Germans had set fire to the boat on the reefs, but the Australians wanted to use it for military purposes and asked Komine to salvage it. On 4 October, Komine headed for the wreck in his schooner *Namanula* with four Japanese and fifty natives (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

However, when he was about to salvage it, he took up a more important mission — piloting the Australian expedition force to capture the German steamer *Komet*. Although Lieutenant-Colonel J. Paton, the commander, only wrote that Komine 'volunteered' his services, (SAMEJIMA, date unknown) explains that there was a profound reason for that.

The harbour-master Jackson called upon Komine and asked him about where the *Komet* could be hiding. He also mentioned that recently the *Komet* captured a Japanese sailing boat in the East Caroline Islands and stole goods. Having heard this, Komine was very angry....and said that Lulu was the only possible port that the *Komet* could enter on the north coast of New Britain. He also said that the Australians would be able to capture the *Komet* without using many soldiers because of the topography where it was hiding. Then he said he would volunteer to assist the expedition and jumped on the *Nusa* (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).
Samejima’s accounts may not be reliable. There is no official report about the Komet’s attack on a Japanese ship in either Japanese or Australian sources, although it was possible, as the Komet sailed between Angaur in the Palau Group and New Britain from 14 August to early October (Mackenzie, 1927). Again, it is most unlikely that Jackson knew of any attack, because he did not know the movements of the Komet until he got information that it was hiding on the north coast of New Britain on 4 October (Mackenzie, 1927).

Samejima’s explanation suggests two possible scenarios. First, Jackson lied to Komine because he needed his knowledge of local waters and people. Secondly, Samejima fabricated the story. The Japanese at Rabaul needed a pretext to assist the Australians, because overt assistance would anger the Germans who had protected them even after the outbreak of war. The Japanese had to maintain good relations with the Germans in order to continue their businesses, because the Germans still controlled most commerce in New Guinea (the Australian forces were inexperienced in colonial administration and left most economic operations in their hands.)

The following is Samejima’s account about the capture of the Komet.

The South Seas rarely get misty, but the mist was so thick that the Komet neglected to set a watch and none of their crew noticed the Nusa’s approach. The Nusa’s crew waited until daybreak, preparing to launch a small boat in case that they found the enemy boat. The harbour-master persistently cautioned Komine to capture the Komet, and Komine repeated confidently, ‘All right, sir.’ On 9 October, the sky in the east became bright. At half past four, the Nusa entered the bay. When she passed the projecting point, the hiding Komet was sighted. The Komet, which used to have a white body, was now painted grey. Quickly the Nusa’s crew lowered a boat, and Komine led three British [sic: they should be Australian] sailors and approached the Komet, raising a white flag in case of being attacked. The boat reached the stern and Komine and others climbed onto the deck. A Chinese boy noticed them and rushed to alert the German commander. Although the commander immediately came out on the deck, still wearing pyjamas, it was too late. The British sailors were already standing by the Komet’s cannon. The German crew and native fighters were too frightened to resist. The commander looked resigned, although reluctant. Komine told him, ‘We have been good friends for a long time, but my action today is not a personal action. I acted so because Japan and Britain are at war against Germany. Please surrender immediately.’ Komine led the commander into his bedroom and locked the room from the outside and placed a guard. Then he ordered the German crew to prepare for sailing and commanded the ship on its way to Rabaul. The Komet arrived in Simpson Harbour on the morning on 11 October. The [Australian] governor and other people were rejoiced to hear of the unexpected feat and admired Komine’s bravery. Komine went home, but the governor sent a car to pick him up to hear his full report. I accompanied him, carrying souvenirs—captured documents from
the *Komet*, her flag and a painting of the German emperor. The British governor and his staff officers celebrated the capture of the *Komet*, welcoming Komine as the main guest. They held a big banquet and cheered Britain and Japan. Komine cheered *banzai* three times. On the same day, the Japanese squadron radioed to the administration to inquire after the safety of Komine and other Japanese. I hurried to the administration headquarters and replied by radio, saying, ‘We and our properties were all safe but we were suffering from a shortage of food. We request supplies of rice and soya sauce urgently.’ On the following day, the governor granted the title of captain to Komine with a letter of appreciation for his assistance and declared that Komine was no longer required to take off his hat to salute except for saluting the governor (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

Jackson’s report to Holmes on the capture of the *Komet* also verifies reports of Komine’s bravery and Australian appreciation.

I would point out the following additional points for your consideration:—

1. Mr. Komine (Japanese) of Rabaul was on board *Komet* [sic; it should be *Nusa*], and thanks to his help and knowledge of natives *Komet* was exactly located. Mr. Komine showed great enterprise and an absolute indifference to the probability of *Nusa* receiving *Komet*’s fire; he also showed his great anxiety to help us by abandoning his occupation of salvaging a wreck off the Talele Islands in order to accompany the expedition.\(^{[21]}\)

The Australian records show the invitation to Komine to the official dinner.\(^{[22]}\) However, there are no records to confirm Samejima’s accounts of Komine’s persuasion of the German commander, the granting of the title of captain and his privilege not to have to take off his hat — except for several letters that referred to ‘Captain’ Komine.\(^{[23]}\) Probably Komine’s persuasion was Samejima’s exaggeration and the granting of the title of captain and the privilege was unofficial.

Komine also assisted the Australians by providing them with the information that ‘a German trader [Heinrich Wahlen] in Rabaul was communicating to Germans in America information regarding the movements of the Australian naval and military forces in and around Rabaul, by means of documents concealed in bales of merchandise shipped by him to America.’\(^{[24]}\) Due to this service, Komine was granted Wahlen’s fishing rights in the Western Islands.

Komine’s assistance to the Australians continued. He piloted the expedition to the Admiralty and Hermit Islands from 19 to 30 November.\(^{[25]}\) But this participation was strongly motivated by his self-interest. Komine was anxious about his wife and employees and plantations in the Admiralty Islands, as communications with the islands had been cut since the outbreak of war. Samejima wrote:

Komine’s wife was in the plantation on Admiralty Islands where there were about
ten Japanese employees and four hundred native labourers. However, after the outbreak of war, Komine had not been able to visit the islands and was anxious about their safety. Then on 10 November, the British Military Administration requested Komine to make a trip to the islands, as the German officials there had not been contacted yet. Komine loaded provisions unto the steamer *Siar* for the Japanese on his plantations. The expedition force left on 13 November. When the *Siar* arrived at the Admiralties, the German district officer attempted to escape into the bush with native fighters carrying weapons and provisions. Komine stopped him, explained the situation at Rabaul and told him that his resistance would hardly affect the whole situation. The officer capitulated willingly and surrendered the office building and documents at Lorengau...Komine checked his plantation, supplied food [to his employees], and returned to his shipyard at Rabaul with his wife and child on 8 December. Presently about ten British [sic] soldiers are stationed in the Admiralties and keeping the peace (SAMEJIMA, date unknown).

Most of Samejima's account accords with the Australian official dairy, except for Komine's persuasion to the German officer. The diary does not mention Komine's involvement in the German surrender.

22nd November: ...The arrival [at Lorengau] was a complete surprise, and as soon as the Government Officials noticed soldiers they gathered all the Native Police, and taking arms, ammunition and provisions made for the bush. Captain Travers was successful in capturing the head Official, and explained the form of capitulation to him, and directed him to go out and bring the other officials and Native Police. At first he refused to do this, but finally consented, and being placed on parole was sent out to bring the whole force. During the interval all building were seized and placed under guard; the German flag was hauled down and the British flag hoisted in its place. Within half an hour the whole force had returned and were disarmed. Government books and money were handed over.\(^{26}\)

Again Samejima seems to have exaggerated the significance of Komine's actions. But the expedition satisfied Komine's self-interest. The first destination was Rambutju Island (21 November) where Komine owned a plantation. On the following day, having made the Germans capitulate at Lorengau, the force reached Pityilu Island where Komine had another plantation. The following morning Captain Travers breakfasted with Mrs Komine. And just before returning to Rabaul, the expedition force salvaged Komine's auxiliary schooner wrecked on Korat Reef three months previously.\(^{27}\) Thus, Komine was successful in impressing the Australians and consequently winning their support. Apart from the administration's support to Komine, the shortage of food was temporarily alleviated by the help of Burns Philp (an Australian trade company).
The Japanese residents rejoiced to see the arrival of the Japanese squadron at Rabaul on 28 December (SAMEJIMA, date unknown). Komine and Samejima explained the shortage of food to the Japanese captains and received ample rice and soya sauce. Samejima’s report then concludes with a business report for the 1914 financial year and noted that the outbreak of war did not greatly affect business that year, as most orders for shipbuilding had been contracted in the previous year. New contracts were made with the Australians—the repair of the Madang, Samoa and Kolonial Gesellschaft.

**Australian attitudes**

Japanese participation in the war as an ally of Britain encouraged the Australians to be friendly. The Australians showed genuine hospitality when two cruisers (Chikuma and Yahagi) and two destroyers (Yamakaze and Umikaze) visited Rabaul on 28 December 1914. Holmes entertained the Japanese captains at dinner at Government House and the Japanese reciprocated. On 5 April 1915, the cruiser Nisshin arrived at Rabaul and Pethebridge took the Japanese captain Kanahara sightseeing around Rabaul and held an official dinner. The development of mutual respect was illustrated in the report of the Australian district officer at Madang, when the Nisshin visited on 11 April.

The [Japanese] officers and men were duly entertained by the [Australian] officers and men of this garrison....Both nationalities fraternised, and my men showed the sailors the sights of Madang and surrounding district....I took particular care that the troops here were smart, soldier-like, and well dressed. They turned out a credit to the 3rd Battalion. Although some 500 Japanese sailors had the run of Madang for two days, I place it on record that I heard not a single complaint, and nothing was touched in the town or surrounding plantations.

Furthermore, when an official dinner was held to celebrate the King’s Birthday on 3 June, the Japanese captain and officers of the warship Manshu, which arrived on the same day, were invited. Similarly, when the Japanese Training Squadron visited Rabaul in the end of July 1915, the acting administrator, ‘made their stay here [at Rabaul] as enjoyable as possible under the circumstances’. The administrator’s hospitality was greatly appreciated: the Japanese Rear Admiral commented that ‘I cannot be too much grateful for your hospitality and warmth you have extended to the officers and men under my command and I am sure they will carry about the most delightful remembrance of their visit to this fair territory.’ Indeed, the Training Squadron had received a warm welcome in Australia before coming to New Guinea, and the Japanese Consul-General Shimizu Seizaburō at Sydney reported it to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo, and later the Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu sent an official letter of appreciation to the British Ambassador at Tokyo.

Australian friendliness was also directed to the Japanese residents. Pethebridge reinforced the European status of the Japanese by introducing regulations for the burial
of Europeans and Japanese in the European cemetery at Rabaul.

I, the Administrator during British Military Occupation of the Colony of German New Guinea, do hereby make the following regulations for the burial of Europeans and Japanese in the European Cemetery at Rabaul, to come into operation forthwith...... No European or Japanese shall be buried in any place in Rabaul other than in the Cemetery above described (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION—(LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1916).

This shows a clear contrast to the Australian attitudes towards the Chinese. The Chinese residents were to be buried in an area in the Botanic Gardens separate from the European and Japanese cemetery (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION—(LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1916). (35)

Japanese relations with the Australian administration continued to develop, and the way they developed resembles that of their relations with the German administration. Just as Komine's relations with the Germans had been established by the administration's need of Komine's vessel for administrative purposes, his relations with the Australians developed due to their lack of vessels to patrol the outstations. The Australian force assigned Komine to repair the former German steamer *Nusa* and hired Komine's launch *Banzai* for general naval purposes. (36) Komine exploited the situation to improve his business which had been badly affected by the war. Upon Komine's request, Holmes urged Melbourne to pay for his repair work.

Komine has asked me to personally urge the payment of his accounts as early as possible, as owing to War conditions, he has been unable to obtain funds from his country, and is considerably short of money. Komine has been of great assistance to the Navy and the Administration, and I ask that his request be complied with. (37)

The Australians also gave exceptional protection for Komine's trading. Komine was allowed to export a small shipment of copra and marine produce directly to Japan in Japanese ships, (38) although after the Australian occupation all products from New Guinea were to be sent to Sydney by Burns Philp.

Despite this protection, however, by the end of 1915 Komine's business suffered acutely from the war, and in November he had to assign 'all right, title, estate, interest, claim and demand in his Leasehold Lands in the Admiralty Group (Manus) to the Neu Guinea Compagnie [German company] of Rabaul, New Britain, by way of security for debt' (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION—(LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1915). Komine asked the Australians for help, and they helped him.
In 1916, the Australian Administrator advanced money to Komine to protect him against foreclosure by his mortgagee, the Neu Guinea Compagnie. This was done in consideration of the damage Komine had suffered in his business through Germans withdrawing their custom on account of his friendship with the British. From that time on, the Administrator continued to assist Mr. Komine by making him advances against shipments of trocas shell, copra, & etc.\(^{(29)}\)

At the same time, Komine petitioned the Japanese Consul-General in Sydney for financial support from the Japanese government.\(^{(40)}\) It was a long letter extending over nine pages, in which the first half explained how he came to New Guinea and established amicable relations with the German administration, and the latter part related how the war affected his relations with the Germans and his business operations. He wrote that he lost all trust from the Germans after he assisted the Australians to capture the *Komet*, and that the Germans now hated him so much that he could no longer conduct business with the Neu Guinea Compagnie and Hernsheim & Co (both are German companies).

The Australians allowed the Germans to carry on their business until the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty, because the disposal of the colony was not yet decided and had to be decided after the war in Europe ended. Also the Australians' lack of experience in colonial administration, because they were all military personnel, contributed to the continuance of German influence on commercial activities. Thereby the Germans still controlled most economy. The Germans resented Komine's assistance to the Australians and attempted to discontinue business dealing with him.

In addition, Komine faced more difficulties:

The cargo that I ordered from the Japanese agent did not arrive because of the lack of vessels. My shipyard received no new orders from planters—my major clients—who were uncertain about their future after the outbreak of the war and hesitated to build new ships. The shipyard is very quiet and has almost no work except for small repair works. Before the war I had ordered a huge amount of shipbuilding materials expecting more orders, and they are now just stored in the warehouse and only increasing interest payments. The situation is so serious that I have no funds to operate my business. I cannot even pay the wages of the artisans whom I recruited from Japan, promising high salaries. Most of my 1000 hectare [coconut] plantations is still at the stage of planting and produces only small quantity of fruit. But I have to pay generously for food and other things for native labourers and for the wages of the Japanese foremen. Although I had some profits from fishing, they hardly met the deficits in trading, shipbuilding and copra planting.\(^{(41)}\)

Surprisingly Komine's petition was accompanied by two letters from Petethebridge. The first shows that the Australian administration attempted to save Komine's business
operations from being taken over by the Germans.

I have also arranged for liabilities to the extent of £11,000, to be met by the Administration on Komini's [sic] behalf, to assist him in his business and to prevent the German firms here from obtaining full control of all Komini's assets. I consider that the Securities held by the Administration, in connection with these matters are amply sufficient to cover Komini's liabilities.\(^{(42)}\)

His second letter explains why the administration was so generous: 'Since the War started and during British Occupation of the Colony, Komini [sic] has on all occasions, given us valuable assistance in many ways, and I regard his presence in the Colony as an important factor during the future development.'\(^{(43)}\) The Australians had another reason to help Komine. They were afraid of a German monopoly of commercial interests, and the rescue of Komine's business was necessary to limit German influence.

Having received these letters, Consul-General Shimizu wrote to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo. Shimizu sympathised with Komine and urged the government to assist him, introducing him as 'a rare entrepreneur in the South Sea Islands'.\(^{(44)}\) However, the Foreign Ministry declined to assist because of the delicate international situation, pointing out that the disposal of former German territories was still uncertain.\(^{(45)}\) The reply was relayed to Komine, who then wrote a second petition in which he expressed his deep dismay and emphasised the Australian administrators' friendly attitude.\(^{(46)}\) Shimizu also wrote to Tokyo again but had no success.\(^{(47)}\)

Help came through Komine's relatives. They managed to persuade Minamikata Tsunekasu, a millionaire in Wakayama prefecture and the president of the Nan'yō Sangyō Kabushiki Kaisha (South Seas Industrial Company), to purchase and restructure Komine's company. Minamikata agreed to buy the company for 800,000 yen, retaining Komine as a managing director. The official re-structuring was endorsed by the acting administrator Seaforth MacKenzie on condition that: the company pay all its debt to the administration, pay outstanding wages immediately to all employees, and guarantee the payment of the former company's promissory notes to the administration and appoint a manager (or representative) proficient in English and British commercial regulations.\(^{(48)}\) MacKenzie's endorsement was based on his consideration of the 'international policy' that Japan was the ally of the British and the risk that 'Mr. Komine should be in danger of being absorbed by a German company.'\(^{(49)}\) On 10 October 1917, the Company officially took over all Komine's business interests and registered his company as a branch at Rabaul.

There is another example to show Australian leniency to Komine. The Australians took no action against him when they suspected that he removed some parts from a German steamer.\(^{(50)}\) The incident happened when Komine and his employees were found suspicious of 'wrongly removing certain articles from German steamer MORWE'.\(^{(51)}\) But no evidence was found and no actions against Komine were followed,
because Pethebridge thought that the conviction would cause an diplomatic problem and 'considered that unless conviction absolutely certain unwise at that time proceed further.'(52)

**Melbourne's attitudes**

From 1917, in contrast to the administration's friendly attitudes towards the Japanese, Australian officials in Melbourne, then the Australian capital, began to take restrictive measures. Melbourne's policy reflected international politics over the disposal of German territories in the South Pacific. Their main concern for Melbourne was to secure New Guinea as their spoils, just as Tokyo was determined to take over Micronesia. In those circumstances, the Japanese government restricted the entry and trading of non-Japanese in Micronesia. As retaliatory measures, the Australian government restricted Japanese migration and trading in New Guinea. On 31 March 1917 the Australian Defence Minister George Pearce, informed the Japanese Consul-General at Sydney that 'the number of Japanese employees in New Guinea should not at any time exceed the number at the commencement of the military occupation.'(53) In the same year, the Australian government restricted direct copra trade between Rabaul and Japan. The restriction was maintained despite repeated protests by the Japanese Consul-General.(54) In his letter to the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, Shimizu pointed out that one of the reasons for the trade restriction was the Australian fear that the Australians would lose their monopoly of the copra trade, because the German would sell all copra to Komine if the trade was permitted, as they hated the Australians.(55) Similar fear was also shown in Pearce's letter to the Prime Minister; Pearce feared the Japanese monopoly because Australians traders had fewer vessels than their Japanese counterparts.(56) Komine also attempted to open the trade unsuccessfully. He offered to purchase the government ship *Samoa* when it was for sale, provided that trade with Japan was permitted, but it was refused.(57)

Melbourne's policies also reflected public feeling in Australia. Edmund Piesse, the Director of Military Intelligence (1916-1919), and the Director of the Pacific Branch of the Prime Minister's Department (1919-1921), reported:

The instant participation of Japan in the war, and the assistance given in escort for the first convoy of Australian troops, brought about during the first few months of the war, a much warmer feeling towards Japan than had existed for many years previously. But the Japanese occupation of the islands north of the equator in September and October 1914 caused anxiety as soon as it became known to the public. It was not seen that these islands were required by Japan for her own defence, and their commercial value was trifling; their occupation seemed then to point some aggressive purpose.(58)

**Japanese settlers**

The Japanese population in New Guinea began to decline, mainly because the out-
break of the war had caused uncertainty about the future of New Guinea. Although complete yearly statistics are not available either in Japanese or Australian sources, according to a telegram from the Japanese navy, there were 119 Japanese (98 males and 21 females) in 1914, but this total was reduced to 77 (55 males and 22 females) in 1916. However, there was still a steady, although decreasing, inflow of Japanese from 1914 to 1918. The number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese bound for New Guinea was 33 in 1914: 32 before August and one on 4 August. No passport for New Guinea was issued in 1915, and in 1916 the number was 16. In 1917 and 1918, only three were issued each year. That indicates that the decline in the Japanese population in New Guinea was due to the increase in Japanese departing. Probably the bad management of Komine’s business encouraged his employees to return after their contracts and he attracted few migrants. However, although the number was declining slightly, the Japanese community was the second largest civilian ‘white’ population. There were 680 Germans, 92 Japanese and 66 British (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION—(LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1917).

The Japanese population mainly consisted of professional migrants such as artisans (boat builders and sawyers), fishermen, traders, planters and prostitutes. In 1917, the largest occupational group was 33 male ‘artisans, labourers and etc.’, followed by 13 female ‘others’, 12 male ‘settlers and planters’, 10 male ‘sailors and fishermen’, 8 male ‘business and traders’ and 8 female ‘private’ (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION—(LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1917). The 13 female ‘others’ were very likely prostitutes working in the brothel owned by Ah Tam and the 8 female ‘private’ would be wives who accompanied their husbands.

Japanese community

The Japanese were developing from a mere group of artisans to a self-contained community with amenities such as stores, restaurant, barber, brothel and cinema. The community had now grown into the type seen in major towns in Southeast Asia. The development was accompanied by internal changes. The monolithic community under Komine’s leadership began to crack, as other Japanese established businesses and started competing with him. The largest competitor was Okaji Santarō’s Okaji Shōkai (the Okaji Company). The company seems to have been established in May 1914 on Buka Island adjacent to Bougainville, and operated a general store and copra plantation and exported marine products. The company’s scale was much smaller than Komine’s. In 1917 the Okaji Company’s capital was 15,000 yen, its annual profits were 30,000 yen, the number of Japanese employees was 5 and there were 40 local labourers, while Komine's company's corresponding figures were 300,000 yen, 700,000 yen, 45 and 500 (GAIMU-SHŌ TSUSHŌ-KYŌKU, 1917). Another company was established on 15 May 1915. Three Japanese ship builders (Mori Seizaemon, Hamasaki Tomoshiro and Nishikawa Zen’ichi) set up S. Mori and Co. after acquiring a leasehold from the administration (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION—(LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1915). The scale of S. Mori and Co. is unknown. The
establishment of new companies probably stimulated the increase in trade between Japan and New Guinea, although it was a negligible amount in the total external trade of Japan. Imports from Japan tripled from £10,650 in 1915 to £31,064 in 1918, and exports to Japan increased almost fourfold from £12,188 in 1915 to £48,546 in 1918.\(^{(44)}\)

In 1918, the Japanese community received the addition of a unique Japanese, Imaizumi Masao, who acquired half an acre leasehold and opened a picture theatre, New Britain Pictures.\(^{(45)}\) Before coming to Rabaul, he was in the Dutch East Indies where he had been hunting birds of paradise and exporting them to London.\(^{(46)}\) His cinema screened both Japanese and western pictures for Japanese and Australian residents, and employed Australian technicians.\(^{(47)}\) More interestingly, the way he had gone to the Dutch East Indies shows his distant connection to Enomoto Takeake, the first Japanese official who advocated colonising New Guinea. Imaizumi came to the Dutch East Indies with Jūtarō Hosoya, a close friend of Imaizumi (a son of Jūdayū Hosoya, a samurai of Sendai-han.) Jūdayū had fought alongside Enomoto in the Boshin War of 1868. Jūtarō, being a son of Jūdayū who had admired Enomoto, was influenced by Enomoto's idea of southward advancement and came to Dutch New Guinea with enthusiasm to develop the South Seas for Japan. As Jūtarō and Imaizumi were close friends, Imaizumi was possibly influenced by Jūtarō's enthusiasm. Probably the rumour of Komine's bravery in New Guinea as well as the chance of success in starting a new business may have motivated Imaizumi.

Like Europeans, the Japanese were not immune from malaria and other tropical sickness. Although it was not fatal, Komine developed black water fever and was hospitalised in Namanula Hospital on 14 February in 1917, where MacKenzie went to see him.\(^{(48)}\) Some other Japanese were also hospitalised where their behaviour annoyed the Australian medical officer. It was reported that:

This I regret to say has not been as successful as was anticipated, owing to the Japanese not being amenable to hospital discipline; the hospital has become a rendezvous for all Japanese after dark, with the result that the patients were neglected and did not improve as rapidly as desired.\(^{(49)}\)

How many Japanese died from tropical sickness is unknown. Only the death of a shipwright, Hamasaki Tomoshirō, can be confirmed.\(^{(50)}\)

**Racial relations**

Generally the Australians at Rabaul, apart from the administrative staff, did not pay much attention to the Japanese. Other than official reports related to Komine, there are a few Australian accounts of the Japanese and those accounts are all brief and none of them mention any individual (not even Komine). Captain Jens Lyng, an administrative staff, was the only Australian who observed the Japanese relatively closely and published his impression. He wrote about the Japanese women in the section describing
Rabaul's China town, introducing them as part of the landscape that added an oriental flavour.

.....and the dainty Japanese women in the fascinating dress of their native land, tripping ungainly about on their wooden clogs and threatening every moment to topple over; or half sitting, half standing mamselles outside some of the restaurants, fixing their slanting in-expressive eyes on the passers-by (LYNG, 1919).

The articles in the newspaper, The Rabaul Record, also shows Australian indifference. There were only three articles on the Japanese from 1914 to 1918. Interestingly, unlike the public in Australia who were anxious about the Japanese influence in the South Pacific, the articles show that local Australians did not relate the local Japanese to the general fear of Japanese aggression. The first article described how the Japanese fishermen removed the live fish from inside the trochus shell, the second was about the poor quality of Japanese matches, and the third gave lively news about a Japanese wrestling tournament between visiting sailors and the local Japanese. (7) It seems that most Australians at Rabaul saw the Japanese merely as part of local scenery in an exotic territory.

There are few records to show Japanese relations with New Guineans. Samejima's report had no reference to them, and oral evidence is generally not sufficiently specific to identify the period between 1914 and 1918. However, one event, recorded by the administration, may tell one aspect of Japanese attitudes to New Guineans. Nakayama Bukachi, an employee of Komine, was murdered by a local boy, Sapo, at Kali Bay in Manus in late November 1916. Sapo was one of local crew on a Japanese fishing vessel. The Australian District Officer found that the murder took place because of the brutality of Nakayama's treatment of the boy. He reported,

I am also convinced that the boy was cruelly beaten by the Japanese [Nakayama] who not only beat him but tried to throttle him, he also beat his head on the hatch. The marks on the boy's body plainly shows the rough treatment that he received and there was no doubt that the boy was thoroughly frightened, so picking up the bamboo struck the Japanese the one fatal blow. (72)

At the court, Sapo's act was regarded as 'self-defence' but he received a sentence of 'six months imprisonment to be served in Rabaul'. (73) Although the cause of Nakayama's brutality was not reported, the event shows that some Japanese accepted the use of violence to New Guinean employees, as the murder happened on a schooner while other Japanese crew were also on the boat.
Conclusion

Multiple layers of relations over nations and races are major characteristic of this time and place. Japan formed a military alliance with Britain (and thereby Australia) and fought against Germany, so the Australians were temporarily less hostile to the Japanese than before the war. Soon, however, they became suspicious of Japanese expansion in the Pacific. Germans in New Guinea had continued to protect the Japanese interests until they cooperated with the Australian invasion forces. The Japanese had to sacrifice their long-term relations with the Germans in order to ensure their presence in New Guinea, and the Germans resented the agile Japanese.

In these intricate circumstances, the Japanese encountered a challenge to keep their presence under new white rulers and also saw a chance to promote their status. To ensure their presence, they had to establish friendly relations with the Australians who would be new rulers of the colony. This was easily done, because formally the Japanese were allies to the Australians. In terms of status, the Japanese were temporarily more equal to their western counterparts under Australian military rule than under the Germans. Such was reflected in Australian courtesies in greeting Japanese naval visits. Dinners and other functions were held and Komine and some residents were invited. And administrators generously assisted Komine's business. These Australian attitudes were, of course, greatly affected by Komine's assistance to their military operations. But also the ignorance of the Australians about the colony (because they were all military personnel) and their lack of vessels contributed to their leniency. The Japanese were willing hands who knew much better about the colony.

However, the Australians in Melbourne would not acknowledge the Japanese as equals to their Australian counterparts. Their new territory had to be an extension of a white-controlled periphery. Migration and trade restrictions were soon applied. On the other hand, the Japanese government's indifference to the settlers was reinforced, because the government's main concern was to secure Micronesia and to avoid unnecessary conflict with Australia which was determined to control New Guinea. Thus, Japanese status in the colony hardly changed: they remained subordinate to white masters. Komine's agility only helped the settlers to keep on living in New Guinea.

The temporary leniency of the Australians brought about some development in the Japanese community; trading with Japan increased and business activities diversified. However, as the Australian government began to reinforce restrictive policies towards the end of the war the Japanese were no longer able to enjoy the full protection of the white rulers. The 1914-1918 period was a turning point from prosperity under German rule to the beginning of decline under Australian rule.

In Papua, Japanese experienced no impact. They were almost invisible to the Australians, because their number was small and their village-based life style, which was more identical with the Papuan than with white settlers', hardly aroused Australian concerns. They hardly had any influence to the maintenance of white rule.
Notes

(1) Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō [The list of overseas passport issues], 1913-1915, Japanese Diplomatic Record (hereafter JDR), 3.8.5.8

(2) Komine Isokichi was a leader of the Japanese settlement in New Guinea. He was a planter, boatbuilder and trader. He first went to Thursday Island near the northern tip of Australia in the mid-1890s and engaged in shell fishing. Then he went to German New Guinea around the turn of the century and worked for the German administration and finally succeeded in acquiring a lease for copra planting and other commercial concession. For more detail, see IWAMOTO, H., 1995, 'The origin and development of Japanese settlement in Papua and New Guinea, 1890-1914', South Pacific Study, 15(2): 97-133

(3) One of the most influential thinkers in modern Japan. He was a journalist, historian and nationalist. At Tokyo Trial after the Pacific War, he was sentenced a class A war criminal.

(4) He took office as the Governor of Tokyo in 1884, then took various ministerial positions in the Japanese government such as the Minister for Education, Home Affairs, Law, and Communications.

(5) The Bank of Taiwan is a semiofficial bank established in 1899. Initially it served as a central bank in Taiwan, a Japanese colony, to assist resource exploitation and economic development. After World War I, it began to promote the economic development of Micronesia and the expansion of trade between Taiwan and South China and South Seas islands.

(6) Hosaka made a tour to some of the South Seas islands in 1913.

(7) The date of Fujikawa's arrival at Rabaul was not clear. According to his book, it was either 1901 or 1903.

(8) Fujita Gumi was then one of the giant mining compaines, competing with Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. It operated the Kosaka copper mine in Akita—one of the largest copper mines then in Japan.

(9) Government House, Port Moresby to the Minister of State for External Affairs, Melbourne, 6 March 1916, Australian Archives (hereafter AA), A1/1 16/26203, 'Japanese mining experts visiting Papua'

(10) The oral evidence provides the information for only six Japanese—Koto, Mabe, Murakami, Matoba, Taichirō Tanaka and Shigematsu Tanaka, although the statistics of Papua Annual Report shows the presence of eight to nine Japanese in this period. The author speculates that other Japanese were mixed-race Japanese (children between Japanese settlers and Papuans).

(11) Interview by the author with Murakami, Kalo (son of Murakami, Heijirō), 4 January 1994, Misima Island, Milne Bay, Papua New Guinea (here after PNG)

(12) Interview by the author with Isikini, Honor and Fred (daughter and grandson of Tanaka Shigematsu), 21 December 1993, Nigila Village, Milne Bay, PNG

(13) According to the report, Komine's company was called 'Komine Shōkai' (Komine
Company), although German and Australian record say its name was ‘Nan'yō Kögyō Kaisha’ (South Seas Industry Company). ‘Nan'yō Kögyō Kaisha’, which was formed in 1912, was a new name for ‘Komine Shōkai’. It seems that Komine was using the name, ‘Komine Shōkai’, until 1915 in Japanese official documents.

(14) The report is owned by Komine’s descendant, Komine Shigenori in Nagasaki. The date of the writing of the report is unknown, but judging from the content, it seems to have been written and submitted in mid-1915. To whom it was submitted is not recorded, but most likely it was the Japanese consul-general in Sydney, as official correspondence from German New Guinea was normally sent to Sydney then to the Foreign Ministry at Tokyo.

(15) Samejima mistakenly stated the date of the Japanese declaration of the war 18 August.


(17) Colonel Administrator William Holmes to the Minister of Defence at Melbourne, 13 November 1914, AA, AWM33 11, ‘Report and letters from Colonel W Holmes to Minister for Defence and Colonel J G Legge, Chief of the General Staff (August 1914-January 1915)’

(18) Although the Komet was not a battleship, the Australians feared that its wireless facilities could be used to coordinate the operation of the German Pacific fleet.

(19) Lieutenant-Colonel Paton’s correspondence, 12 October 1914 (in MACEKENZIE, 1927)

(20) The Nusa was an Australian boat with the expedition.

(21) Jackson, 12 October 1914 (in MACEKENZIE, 1927)

(22) 4 December 1914, AA, AWM33 10/1/1, ‘Ex-German New Guinea. Diary of events in connection with the Australian Naval and Military Expedition under the command of Colonel W. Holmes DSO, VD. 10 August 1914—22 February 1915’


(25) 19 November to 30 November, AA, AWM33 10/1/1, ‘Ex-German New Guinea. Diary of events in connection with the Australian Naval and Military Expedition under the command of Colonel W. Holmes DSO, VD. 10 August 1914—22 February 1915’

(26) Diary of events in connection with expedition to Admiralty and Hermit Islands, AA, ibid.

(27) Ibid.

(28) Holmes to the Minister of State for Defence, 29 December 1914, AA, AWM33 10/4, op.cit.
(29) Rabaul, Administrator, Memorandum for the Minister of State for Defence, 8 April 1915, AA, AWM33 12/4, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning of Colonel S A Pethebridge CMG, Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (April 1915)’

(30) Rabaul, Administrator, Memorandum for the Minister of State for Defence, 1 May 1915, AA, AWM33 12/5, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning of Colonel S A Pethebridge CMG, Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (May 1915)’

(31) Pethebridge wrote, ‘...under the peculiar circumstances of our occupation and incidental to our relationship with the natives, I thought it was wise to make our King’s Birthday an occasion that would impress our new subjects,’ in Memorandum for the Minister of State for Defence, 5 June 1915, AA, AWM33 12/6, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning of Colonel S A Pethebridge CMG, Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (June 1915)’

(32) Memorandum for the Hon. the Minister of State for Defence, Melbourne, 2 August 1915, AA, AWM33 12/8, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning of Colonel S A Pethebridge CMG, Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (August 1915)’

(33) Rear Admiral Chisaka’s letter quoted in ibid.

(34) Shimizu to Katō, 16 July 1915 and Ōkuma to the British Ambassador, 1 September 1915, JDR, 5.1.3.4., ‘Teikoku renshū kantai kankei zassan dai 5 kan [The Miscellaneous record on the Imperial Training Squadron, vol.5]’

(35) However, later the administration also gave European status to the Chinese and repealed the discriminatory regulation on the locations of the burial in 1918.


(37) Holmes to the Minister of State for Defence, 2 January 1915, ibid.

(38) Memorandum for the Ministry of State for Defence by Pethebridge, 14 December 1915, AA, AWM33 12/11, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning of Colonel S A Pethebridge CMG, Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (December 1915)’; List of Japanese vessels and cargoes for and out of Rabaul, date unknown, AA, CP661/15/1 BOX 1, ‘Papers of the Royal Commission on Late German New Guinea—Mr Atlee Hunt (Commissioner)’


(40) Komine to Shimizu, 19 May 1916, JDR, 3.4.6.3., ‘Nan’yō ni okeru hōjin kigyō kankei zakken [Miscellaneous matters concerning Japanese enterprises in the South Seas], vol.1’

(41) Ibid.
(42) Pethebridge to Shimizu, 22 May 1916, ibid.
(43) Pethebridge to Shimizu, date unknown but marked No. 2 in Japanese, ibid.
(44) Shimizu to Ishii, 10 June 1916, ibid.
(45) The Foreign Ministry, date unknown, ibid.
(47) Shimizu to Terauchi, 9 November 1916, ibid.
(48) The report by Arata Gunkichi, March 1921, Komine shōkai baishū shimatsu [Settlement of the purchase of the Komine Company], JDR, 3.5.12.12., ‘Nan’yō dokuryō shōtō ni okeru tsūshō narabi sangyō kankei zakken [Miscellaneous matters concerning commerce and industry in German territories in the South Seas]’
(49) MacKenzie to the Minister for State of Defence, 8 March 1918, AA, AWM33 55/2, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning administration of German New Guinea form Lt Col S S MacKenzie, Acting Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (March-April 1918) [Concerning Isokichi Komine—shipment of Trocas Shell to Japan (8 March 1918); name and style of citation of the colony of German New Guinea (23 March 1918); annual report of the survey Department for 1917 (11 March 1918)]’
(50) Pethebridge to Defence, Melbourne, 24 July 1917; Trumble to the administrator, 20 July 1917, AA, AWM33 45/2, ‘German New Guinea. Telegrams between the Department of Defence and the Administrator, Rabaul (May-August 1917)’
(51) Pethebridge to Defence, 25 July 1917, ibid.
(52) Ibid.
(53) Prime Minister's Department, op.cit., p.11; The military administration in New Guinea was placed under the Defence Minister at Melbourne.
(54) Shimizu to Defence Department, Melbourne, 4 December 1918, AA, AWM33 46/6, ‘German New Guinea. Telegrams between the Department of Defence and the Administrator, Rabaul (November-December 1918)’
(55) Shimizu to Uchida, 9 December 1918, JDR, 3.4.2.50-13-2, ‘Ōshū sensō no keizai bōeki ni oyobosu eikyō ni kansuru zakken dai 3 kan gōshū [Miscellaneous report on the effects of the Great War on economy and trade, Vol.3, Australia]’
(56) Pearce to Prime Minister, 20 April 1918, AA, MP1049 1918/073, ‘Secret and confidential Navy Office files’
(57) Johnstone to Defence, Melbourne, 8 May 1918, AA, AWM33 46/3, ‘German New Guinea. Telegrams between the Department of Defence and the Administrator, Rabaul (May-June 1918)’
(58) Australia & Japan, note of statements made by Major E. L. Piesse in a conversation with Mr. Hanihara, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr. S. Shimizu, Consul-General for Japan at Sydney, Gwaimusho, 25th December 1919, MS882, Piesse Papers, Series 5. Japan, Folders 1, Manuscript Room, National Library of Australia, Canberra
(59) The Vice-Minister of the Navy to the Vice-Admiral Takeshita, 8 July 1919, JDR, 7.1.5.10, ‘Zaigai nai gai jin no koguchi chōsa zakken [Miscellaneous matters of the
household survey on the foreigners in overseas territories). However, the census by the Australian military administration shows different figures; there were 236 (201 males and 36 females) in December 1914 (Government Gazette, British Administration – German New Guinea, Vol.I, No.3, 15 September 1914, Rabaul, p.p.4-5) and 92 (69 males and 23 females) in 1917 (GOVERNMENT GAZETTE, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION – (LATE) GERMAN NEW GUINEA, 1917). The Australian figure of 1914 seems to be inaccurate because the number of passports issued by the Japanese Foreign Ministry to the Japanese bound for New Guinea by 1914 was about 100. See the section of ‘population’ in IWAMOTO, H., 1995, ‘The origin and development of Japanese settlement in Papua and New Guinea, 1890-1914’, South Pacific Study, 15(2): 97-133.

(60) Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō, 1914-1918, JDR, 3.8.5.8
(61) Such amnicities were observed by the naval officers who visited Rabaul (NIHON TEIKOKU KAIGUN GUNREI-BU [Japanese Imperial Navy Military Command Section], 1915).
(62) Okaji first went to Thursday Island in 1901 when he was nineteen years old and later moved to New Guinea; October to December 1901, JDR, 3.8.5.8 (micro film no.ryo-026), ‘Kaigai ryoken kafu hyō’
(63) Suzuki Eisaku (Japanese consul general at Sydney) to Uchida Yasunari, JDR, 3.4.6.8, ‘Zai nan'yō hōjin keiei kigyō chōsa ikken [Report on the Japanese companies in the South Seas]’
(64) Prime Minister’s Department, Territory of New Guinea, Treatment of Foreigners and Foreign Interests, A Summary to 31st March, 1923, Melbourne, p. 9, in ‘Piesse Paper, Series 6’, MS882, Manuscript, National Library of Australia, Canberra
(65) Ibid.
(66) Dutch document on admission of travel, 29 August 1913; Invoice of Australian Films Ltd. to Imaizumi’s New Britain Pictures, 13 November 1924, manuscripts owned by Imaizumi Kōtarō (son of Imaizumi Masao), Nagoya, Japan
(67) Imaizumi Kōtarō’s letter to the author, 3 July 1993
(68) The report by Arata Gunkichi, op.cit. The Japanese were treated in the quarter separated from the locals.
(69) Captain Henry Field-Marshall to P.M.O., 25 May 1915, AA, AWM33 12/6, ‘Reports and memoranda concerning of Colonel S A Pethebridge CMG, Administrator, Rabaul to Department of Defence (June 1915)’
(70) Interview by the author with Nishikawa Mokutarō (ex-Rabaul shipwright in the late 1910s), 29 June 1993, Amakusa, Kumamoto, Japan
(71) The Rabaul Record, 1 March 1916, 1 October 1916, 1 September 1917, Rabaul
(72) Captain Webster to the Administrator, 25 November 1916, AA, A2/1 17/3714, ‘Japanese in (late) German New Guinea’
(73) Memorandum for the Administrator, 4 December 1916, Ibid.
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